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Abstract
Three key issues have arisen for centrally-managed wholesale electric power
markets in Europe and the United States as they attempt to handle an increased
penetration of variable energy resources. First, rigid definitions for energy and
reserve products make it difficult to ensure appropriate compensation for impor-
tant needed flexibility in start-up times, ramp-rates, power dispatch levels, and
duration. Second, participation restrictions hinder the achievement of an even
playing field for potential providers of flexible services. Third, reliance on out-
of-market compensation for the provision of some valued services encourages
strategic manipulation. This study examines the possibility of addressing these
three issues through the introduction of standardized energy and reserve con-
tracts with swing (flexibility) in their contractual terms. Concrete examples are
used to demonstrate how the trading of these standardized contracts can be
supported by linked forward markets in a manner that permits efficient real-time
balancing of net load subject to system and reserve-requirement constraints.
Comparisons with existing wholesale electric power markets are given, and key
policy implications are highlighted.
Keywords: Electric power markets, variable energy resources, standardized
contracts, swing (flexibility), energy and reserve co-optimization, linked forward
markets
1 Introduction
European and U.S. electricity sectors have undergone substantial restructur-
ing over the past twenty years. They have devolved from highly regulated sys-
tems operated by vertically integrated utilities to relatively decentralized systems
based more fully on market valuation and allocation mechanisms.
As part of this restructuring, oversight agencies have been established at
several different levels to encourage cooperation and coordination. The Eu-
ropean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E),
founded in 2008, currently consists of forty-one Transmission System Operators
(TSOs) from thirty-four European countries; its primary task is to promote the
coordinated management of the European power grid (ENTSO-E, 2015). The
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U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversees the activities of
six of the seven U.S. Independent System Operators (ISOs), established since
the mid-1990s, that manage power system operations in electric energy regions
comprising approximately 60% of U.S. generating capacity (EIA, 2015).1
These restructuring efforts have been driven by a desire to ensure efficient
energy production and utilization, reliable energy supplies, affordable energy
prices, and effective rules and regulations for environmental protection. In keep-
ing with the latter goal, a dramatic change is taking place in energy mixes:
namely, a rapid penetration of variable energy resources combined with a move-
ment away from traditional thermal generation.
Variable energy resources (VERs) are renewable energy resources, such as
wind and solar power, whose generation cannot be closely controlled to match
changes in load or to meet other system requirements. Consequently, the in-
tegration of VERs tends to increase the volatility of net load (i.e., load minus
as-available generation) as well as the frequency of strong ramp events. Flexi-
bility in service provision by other types of resources then becomes increasingly
important to maintain the reliability and efficiency of power system operations.
To accommodate increased VER penetration, TSOs and ISOs have intro-
duced major changes in their market rules and operational procedures (Ela,
2011; ENTSO-E, 2014; Henry et al., 2014; NREL, 2012). These changes in-
clude new products to enhance net load following capability (e.g., ramping prod-
ucts), revised market eligibility requirements to encourage greater VER partic-
ipation, and the introduction of capacity markets in an attempt to ensure suffi-
cient thermal generation as a backstop for the intermittency of VER generation.
Nevertheless, several important issues arising from increased VER penetra-
tion still need to be resolved. One key issue is that energy and reserve products
are variously defined and compensated across the different energy regions;
see, e.g., Ellison et al. (2012). This makes it difficult to compare and evaluate
the efficiency and fairness of system operations across these regions.
A second key issue is appropriate compensation for flexibility in service pro-
vision. TSO/ISO product definitions are specified in broad rigid terms (e.g., ca-
1One U.S. ISO, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), is not under FERC jurisdic-
tion because its grid has been deliberately designed to avoid interstate commerce transactions
that would subject it to U.S. Federal jurisdiction (Spence and Bush, 2009).
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pacity, energy, ramp-rate, regulation, non-spinning reserve) that do not permit
resources to be further differentiated and compensated on the basis of addi-
tional valuable flexibility in service provision, such as an ability to ramp up and
down between minimum and maximum values over very short time intervals.
A third key issue is that attempts to accommodate new products have led
to the introduction of out-of-market (OOM) compensation processes. In 2011
FERC issued Order 755 to address OOM payment problems for one particular
product category in U.S. ISO-managed wholesale power markets: namely, reg-
ulation with different abilities to follow electronic dispatch signals with high accu-
racy (FERC, 2011). However, given its limited scope, Order 755 does not fully
eliminate the need in these markets to resort to OOM processes. As stressed
by Bushnell (2013), the additional complexity resulting from OOM compensa-
tion processes provides increased opportunities for market participants to gain
unfair profit advantages through strategic behaviors.
In response to these issues, a group of researchers sponsored by Sandia
National Laboratories prepared a report (Tesfatsion et al., 2013) recommend-
ing that energy and reserve contracts be standardized in firm and option forms
permitting separate pricing for service availability and for real-time service per-
formance, and that the trading of these contracts be supported by a linked
sequence of forward markets whose design is also standardized. This report
builds on important earlier work by Bidwell (2005), Bunn (2004), Chao and Wil-
son (2002), and Oren (2005), who stress the relevance of options and two-part
pricing for electricity markets.
The current study uses concrete numerical examples to explore the policy
implications of the recommendations in Tesfatsion et al. (2013). In Section 2 we
present a general template for a Standardized Contract (SC) with swing (flex-
ibility) in its contractual terms, together with an illustrative SC example. We
also outline in broad terms how the trading of SCs can be supported by linked
centrally-managed day-ahead and real-time markets. In Section 3 and Sec-
tion 4 we present our main results: namely, examples demonstrating how our
proposed SC system, implemented via linked day-ahead and real-time markets,
permits efficient real-time balancing of net load subject to system and reserve-
requirement constraints.
Comparisons of our proposed SC system with existing European and U.S.
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wholesale power market operations, standardized power contracts, pricing mech-
anisms, and VER initiatives are provided in Sections 5.1-5.4. In Section 5.5 we
discuss how our SC system provides a robust-control approach to the handling
of uncertain net load that avoids the need to specify detailed scenarios with
associated probabilities, a common requirement of standard stochastic control
approaches. In Section 5.6 we conjecture how our proposed SC system, ex-
tended to longer-term forward markets, could help to provide better incentives
for thermal generation capacity investment as a backstop for the intermittency of
VER generation by facilitating the resolution of merit-order and missing-money
problems.
Throughout Sections 2-5 the following key policy implications of our pro-
posed SC system are highlighted:
• permits full market-based compensation for availability and performance
• facilitates a level playing field for market participation
• facilitates co-optimization of energy and reserve markets
• supports forward-market trading of energy and reserve
• permits service providers to offer flexible service availability
• provides system operators with real-time flexibility in service usage
• facilitates accurate load forecasting and following of dispatch signals
• permits resources to internally manage UC and capacity constraints
• permits the robust-control management of uncertain net load
• eliminates the need for OOM payment adjustments
• reduces the complexity of market rules
The concluding Section 6 provides a concise summary discussion of each of
these policy implications.
5
2 Proposed Standardized Contract System
2.1 General Form of a Standardized Contract
Energy refers to the actual generation of electrical energy, whereas reserve
refers to generation-capacity availability. Four standardized contracts are pro-
posed in Tesfatsion et al. (2013) to facilitate energy and reserve trading: namely,
firm contracts (FCs) and option contracts (OCs) taking either fixed or swing form.
An FC is a non-contingent contract that requires specific performance from
both counterparties. It obligates the holder to procure services from the issuer,
and the issuer to deliver these services, under the contractually specified terms
of the FC. In contrast, an OC gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to
procure services from the issuer under contractually specified terms. The right
can be activated by exercise of the OC at a contractually permitted exercise
time. Once exercised, an OC imposes specific performance obligations on both
counterparties. That is, as for an FC, an exercised OC obligates the holder to
procure services from the issuer, and the issuer to deliver these services, under
the contractually specified terms of the OC.
An FC or OC is a fixed contract if each of its contractual terms is designated
as a single possible value. An FC or OC is a swing contract if at least one of
its contractual terms is designated as a set of possible values, thus permitting
some degree of flexibility in its implementation. A fixed FC is a block-energy
contract if its contractual terms obligate the issuer to maintain a specified con-
stant power level during a specified time interval.
As depicted in Fig. 1, fixed/swing OCs, fixed/swing FCs, and block-energy
contracts are all special cases of swing OCs. A swing OC reduces to a fixed OC
if each of its contractual terms is a single possible value. A swing OC reduces
to a swing FC if its permitted exercise times consist of a single time point that
coincides with the contract procurement time. A swing FC reduces to a fixed FC
if each of its contractual terms is a single possible value.
Hereafter, this study focuses on Standardized Contracts (SCs) in swing-OC
form for the flexible provision of energy and reserve services. For concrete-
ness, we next present a template for an SC that provides seven basic types of
services for a particular operating hour: delivery location; down/up direction; ex-
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Figure 1: Hierarchical structure of contracts
ercise time; power-begin time; power-end time; down/up ramp rate; and power
level. We illustrate swing in five of these service types by depicting their sets of
possible values as intervals.2
Template for a Standardized Contract (SC):
SC = [k, d, Tex, Tpb, Tpe, RC , PC , φ] (1)
k = Location where service delivery is to occur
d = Direction (down or up)
Tex = [t
min
ex , t
max
ex ] = Range of possible exercise times tex
Tpb = [t
min
pb , t
max
pb ] = Range of possible power-begin times tpb
Tpe = [t
min
pe , t
max
pe ] = Range of possible power-end times tpe
RC = [−rD, rU ] = Range of possible down/up ramp rates r
PC = [p
min, pmax] = Range of possible power levels p
φ = Performance payment method for real-time service performance
The down/up limits −rD and rU for the ramp-rates r (MW/min) are assumed
to satisfy −rD ≤ 0 ≤ rU . The lower bound pmin for the power levels p (MW) is
assumed to be non-negative. The direction (down or up) of an SC determines
whether these power levels describe power curtailments or absorptions (down)
2SCs can take much more general forms than illustrated in the current study. For example,
SCs can include other types of services such as voltage control, reactive power support, and
energy storage capacity; swing can be present in any of these services; swing possible value
sets do not need to be in interval form; and the operating period does not need to be an hour.
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or power injections (up). The time points tex, tpb, and tpe denote specific calendar
times expressed at the granularity of minutes.
The presence of swing in the contractual terms of an SC permits this SC
to function as both an energy and a reserve product. Actual real-time service
performance under such an SC cannot be determined until after the end of the
operating hour H even if the SC is a firm (non-optional) contract. Consequently,
the contractual terms of an SC include a performance payment method φ to be
used to determine the ex-post payment to the SC issuer for real-time service
performance (if any).
The performance payment method φ can take a wide variety of forms. For ex-
ample, as illustrated in Section 3, φ might denote a pre-specified price ($/MWh)
for delivered down/up energy. More generally, φ could denote a contingent
price for delivered down/up energy that depends on market conditions (e.g., fuel
prices) at the time of the delivery. Alternatively, φ could provide for the compen-
sation of delivered power measured as mileage, i.e., as the sum of absolute-
value up and down power movements over the real-time dispatch interval, a
metric now being used for regulation service performance in many energy mar-
kets to meet the requirements of FERC Order 755 (Beacon Power, 2014).
In order for an SC to be implementable, its contractual terms must satisfy
certain basic requirements. For example, tminpb cannot exceed t
max
pe . In this study
it is presumed that an SC issuer is responsible for ensuring that it can feasibly
implement the terms of any SC it offers. Realistically, however, penalties and
eligibility requirements might need to be introduced to help ensure that the is-
suers of cleared SCs accurately follow real-time dispatch instructions, and that
these instructions are in accordance with the contractual terms of the cleared
SCs. These contract enforcement mechanisms could constitute part of the per-
formance payment method φ included within each SC, or they could be instituted
at the level of the power system as a whole.
2.2 Illustrative Example of a Standardized Contract
The illustrative up-energy SC depicted in Fig. 2 provides a combination of fixed
and swing attributes. The delivery location (bus k) and direction (up) are speci-
fied as single values, as are the exercise time tex, the power-begin time tpb, and
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the power-end time tpe. On the other hand, the down/up ramp rate r and the
power level p are swing attributes that can be varied over a range of values.
The darker (green) area within the resulting corridor of contractually-admissible
power dispatch paths depicted in Fig. 2 is the up-energy injection that results
from one such path. Any actual up-energy injection is compensated ex post in
accordance with the performance payment method φ included among the SC’s
contractual terms. An example of a down-energy SC can be obtained from
Fig. 2 by considering a 180◦ rotation of the depicted figure around the time axis.
Figure 2: Example of an SC for up-energy with ramp-rate and power-level swing
that is offered at bus k by a generator with a maximum capacity of 70MW
The SC depicted in Fig. 2 can be given a more concrete interpretation as an
up-energy SC offered by a Demand Response Resource (DRR) into an ISO-
managed day-ahead market (DAM) on day D-1 for a particular operating hour H
on day D, as follows. Consider a Load Serving Entity (LSE) functioning as a load
aggregator for a large distribution feeder connected to the transmission grid at
a particular bus k. Residential households on this feeder have smart meters
for their HVAC loads in wireless communication with the LSE that permits the
LSE to make adjustments to these loads. The LSE has permission from each
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of these households to make small adjustments in their HVAC energy usage
in return for an agreed-upon monthly lump-sum compensation. The LSE can
participate in the DAM as a DRR either by offering up-energy implemented via
HVAC load reductions or by offering down-energy implemented via HVAC load
increases.
Suppose the LSE participates in the DAM on day D-1 as a DRR by offering
the following up-energy SC at some offer price v for hour H of day D, where hour
H is the time interval between 1300EST and 1400EST:
• Delivery location = Bus k
• Direction = Up
• Tex = Exercise time tex = 0900EST on day D
• Tpb = Power-begin time tpb = 1300EST on day D
• Tpe = Power-end time tpe = 1400EST on day D
• RC = [−1.3MW/min, +1.4MW/Min] = Range of possible down/up ramp
rates r
• PC = [10MW, 50MW] = Range of possible power levels p
• φ = Payment method for compensation of delivered power mileage, includ-
ing a penalty payment adjustment for deviations between instructed and
actual power mileage
Suppose, also, that this SC is cleared by the ISO. The ISO is then obligated to
ensure that the DRR receives in compensation its offer price v as payment for
making available for hour-H operations on day D the services included in this
SC. In turn, the ISO has the right, but not the obligation, to exercise this SC at
0900EST on day D.
If the SC is exercised, the DRR must be ready to follow any electronic dis-
patch signal on day D, starting at time tpb = 1300EST and ending at time tpe
= 1400EST, that calls for the DRR to provide a path of power injections lying
within its offered range PC of power levels that can feasibly be achieved without
violating the DRR’s offered range RC of down/up ramp rates. In turn, the ISO is
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obligated to ensure that the DRR is compensated ex post for the mileage of this
controlled power path in accordance with the terms of the performance payment
method φ.
2.3 Support of SC Trading via Linked Forward Markets
As in Tesfatsion et al. (2013), we propose that SC trading be supported by a se-
quence of linked centrally-managed forward markets whose planning horizons
can range from minutes to years. For concreteness, however, we focus in this
study on the support of SC trading by means of linked day-ahead and real-time
markets that are centrally managed by a non-profit Independent System Oper-
ator (ISO); see Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Proposed ISO-managed day-ahead and real-time markets
The non-ISO participants in our proposed day-ahead market (DAM) and real-
time market (RTM) include: (i) Load-Serving Entities (LSEs) who submit SC de-
mand bids in the form of block energy contracts on behalf of retail energy cus-
tomers; (ii) dispatchable Generation Companies (GenCos), Demand Response
Resources (DRRs), and Energy Storage Devices (ESDs) who submit SC supply
offers; and (iii) non-dispatchable VERs whose as-available generation is treated
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as negative load.3 The requirement that LSE SC demand bids be in block-
energy form avoids the need for LSEs to exercise load-balancing discretion in
the implementation of SCs with swing or option exercise times.
Participation in our proposed DAM/RTM processes is not meant to preclude
electricity traders from procuring physical and financial instruments in power ex-
changes and over-the-counter power markets to hedge their price and volume
risks. However, physical instruments whose terms require the use of transmis-
sion line facilities must be self-scheduled and cleared in the DAM or RTM to
ensure transmission availability and overall system reliability.
The ISO managing the DAM undertakes Security-Constrained Unit Commit-
ment (SCUC) and Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED) conditional
on LSE SC demand bids, ISO SC demand bids (for reserve procurement only),
and SC supply offers from dispatchable GenCos, DRRs, and ESDs. To retain
the ISO’s non-profit status, all costs incurred by the ISO for SC procurement
must be passed through to market participants.
This cost pass-through could simply require all procurement costs to be al-
located to the LSEs in proportion to their share of real-time loads. However, the
presence of performance payment methods φ in SC bids/offers permits more
sophisticated arrangements. For example, an LSE’s cost allocation could be
based in part on its forecasting performance, measured ex post by comparing
its cleared SC demand bids against the actual real-time loads of its customers;
and an SC supplier’s cost allocation could be based in part on the accuracy of
its service performance, measured ex-post by examining how well it was able to
follow real-time dispatch instructions.
The ISO’s DAM SCUC/SCED objective is to minimize the expected total
net cost of ensuring that sufficient generation is available to balance next-day
forecasted net loads with suitable local and system-wide reserve buffers. Dis-
patchable generation availability is determined from dispatchable GenCo, DRR,
and/or ESD supply offers. Next-day net load forecasts for power-balance pur-
3As discussed in Section 5.4, our proposed SC system could be generalized to allow des-
ignated types of VERs to offer their generation as “dispatchable intermittent resources” in
DAM/RTM operations, as is now being permitted in MISO (2011). However, this would raise
a number of issues best left for future studies, e.g., should VERs be charged or penalized the
same as ordinary dispatchable generation for deviations from their cleared dispatch offers?
12
poses are determined from LSE SC demand bids and forecasted VER genera-
tion. Reserve buffers are ensured by ISO SC demand bids.
As usual, the DAM SCUC/SCED is subject to unit commitment (UC) con-
ditions, generation-capacity limits, power-balance constraints, transmission-line
limits, and both local and system-wide reserve-requirement constraints. How-
ever, the imposition of the UC conditions and generation-capacity limits occurs
through the contractual terms of the DAM SC supply offers rather than through
ISO-imposed constraints.
We also propose an ISO-managed RTM that runs a SCED every five min-
utes. Dispatchable GenCos, DRRs, and ESDs can offer SCs into the RTM. Only
the ISO is permitted to procure these SCs, for balancing and reserve procure-
ment purposes; and all ISO RTM procurement costs must be passed through to
market participants in order to preserve the non-profit status of the ISO.
The ISO’s RTM SCED objective is to minimize the expected total cost of
ensuring that adequate generation is available to balance ISO-forecasted real-
time net loads with suitable local and system-wide reserve buffers, given the
existing inventory of previously-cleared SCs. This RTM SCED is subject to
generation-capacity limits, power-balance constraints, transmission-line limits,
and both local and system-wide reserve-requirement constraints. The imposi-
tion of the generation-capacity limits occurs through the contractual terms of the
RTM SC supply offers rather than through ISO-imposed constraints.
SCs can provide a wide diversity of services through their contractual terms.
As discussed in greater detail in Section 5.3, appropriate compensation for
these diverse services requires a flexible pricing mechanism. Our DAM and
RTM are therefore formulated as discriminatory-price auctions in which partic-
ipants pay (or are paid) their bid/offer prices for cleared SCs. These bid/offer
price payments are compensations for service availability. Any real-time ser-
vice performance rendered through these cleared SCs is compensated ex post
in accordance with the performance payment methods appearing among the
contractual terms of the cleared SCs.
Finally, SCs with swing in their contractual terms can function as both en-
ergy and reserve, and SCs in option form can also function as reserve even if
their contractual terms are fixed. Consequently, our proposed DAM and RTM
intrinsically involve a co-optimization of energy and reserve.
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The next two sections use concrete examples to demonstrate how SC trad-
ing can be supported by means of our proposed linked DAM and RTM pro-
cesses in a way that ensures optimal balancing of real-time net loads subject to
system and reserve-requirement constraints.
3 RTM Illustrative Example
3.1 Overview
Sections 3.2 through 3.7 present a numerical example illustrating how SC trad-
ing can be supported by means of an RTM in the absence of transmission con-
gestion and without consideration of linkages to earlier DAM processes. The
handling of RTM transmission congestion is addressed in Section 3.8, and link-
ages with earlier DAM processes are considered in Section 4.
3.2 Basic Assumptions
Suppose an RTM takes place immediately prior to a particular operating pe-
riod for which no congestion is anticipated. For concreteness, we assume this
operating period is a particular hour H on a particular day D, expressed at the
granularity of minutes.
Net load for hour H consists of aggregate load minus aggregate VER as-
available generation. The net load profile for hour H that the ISO forecasts at
the start of the RTM takes the form given in Fig. 4. The objective of the ISO
managing the RTM is to ensure that this forecasted net load profile is balanced
by generation with an appropriate reserve buffer, keeping costs to a minimum.
The ISO attempts to achieve this objective by procuring a suitable combination
of SCs from dispatchable generation suppliers participating in the RTM.
These dispatchable suppliers are assumed to consist of three GenCos with
the following ramp-rate and generation-capacity attributes, expressed in Sec-
tion 2.1 notation:
G1 : rD1 = r
U
1 = 120MW/min,Cap
min
1 = 0MW, Cap
max
1 = 600MW
G2 : rD2 = r
U
2 = 200MW/min,Cap
min
2 = 0MW, Cap
max
2 = 700MW
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Figure 4: ISO-forecasted net load profile for hour H of day D at start of RTM
G3 : rD3 = r
U
3 = 300MW/min,Cap
min
3 = 0MW, Cap
max
3 = 900MW
Each of these GenCo offers into the RTM a collection of portfolios, called Gen-
Ports, together with associated GenPort offer prices. A GenPort consists of one
or more SCs whose terms the GenCo could simultaneously fulfill during hour H
if called upon to do so by the ISO. The ISO can clear at most one GenPort from
each GenCo in the RTM.
The offer price vi,j for GenPorti,j is the payment requested by Gi for guar-
anteeing it will be available in hour H to fulfill the terms of the SCs included in
GenPorti,j if signalled to do so. Thus, vi,j compensates Gi for service availabil-
ity costs, such as avoidable fixed costs and lost opportunity costs. In addition,
assuming GenPorti,j is cleared by the ISO, Gi will also receive ex post perfor-
mance payments for any services it renders during hour H under the contractual
terms of the SCs in GenPorti,j. Any such performance payments will be deter-
mined in accordance with the performance payment methods φ included among
the contractual terms of the SCs in GenPorti,j. For the example at hand, each
of these performance payment methods φ is assumed to take the form of a
pre-specified price ($/MWh) for delivered down/up energy.4
As clarified in subsequent sections, this two-part pricing scheme permits the
GenCos to ensure the recovery of their expected total costs through a market
process, taking into account their local attributes and conditions. It also permits
4For example, each SCi,j,m in GenPorti,j could correspond to a distinct generation unit m
owned by Gi, and the performance payment method φi,j,m for SCi,j,m could be a down/up
energy price ($/MWh) given by the expected next-day marginal dispatch cost for unit m.
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the ISO to closely tailor the cleared RTM GenPorts to real-time needs for net
load balancing subject to system and reserve-requirement constraints.
The ISO is permitted to clear at most one GenPort from each GenCo in the
RTM. The resulting cleared GenPorts can thus be represented in the following
ISO Portfolio (ISOPort) form:
ISOPort = {GenPort1,GenPort2,GenPort3} , (2)
where no procurement from a GenCo Gi (GenPorti=None) is possible.
3.3 RTM Supply Offer Specifications
A GenCo’s RTM supply offer is a collection of GenPorts together with associ-
ated GenPort offer prices. Suppose each GenCo offers up-energy in firm con-
tract form, i.e., exercise time tex = tminex = tmaxex = RTM end-time. Suppressing
location (k), direction (up), the exercise time tex, and measurement units from
SC representations for ease of exposition, the RTM supply offers of GenCos
G1, G2, and G3 are assumed to take the following form:
G1’s supply offer consists of two GenPorts, each with one SC:
GenPort1,1 = {SC1,1} at offer price v1,1, (3)
SC1,1 =[tpb = 0, tpe = 60, |r| ≤ 100, 0 ≤ p ≤ 500, φ = 100]
GenPort1,2 = {SC1,2} at offer price v1,2, (4)
SC1,2 =[tpb = 0, tpe = 60, |r| ≤ 120, 0 ≤ p ≤ 500, φ = 105].
G2’s supply offer consists of three GenPorts with multiple SCs:
GenPort2,1 ={SC2,1,1,SC2,1,2} at offer price v2,1, (5)
SC2,1,1 = [tpb = 10, tpe = 20, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 600, φ = 135]
SC2,1,2 = [tpb = 30, tpe = 60, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 600, φ = 130]
GenPort2,2 ={SC2,2,1,SC2,2,2,SC2,2,3} at offer price v2,2, (6)
SC2,2,1 = [tpb = 0, tpe = 10, |r| ≤ 100, 0 ≤ p ≤ 100, φ = 105]
SC2,2,2 = [tpb = 10, tpe = 20, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 600, φ = 135]
SC2,2,3 = [tpb = 30, tpe = 60, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 600, φ = 130]
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GenPort2,3 ={SC2,3,1,SC2,3,2,SC2,3,3} at offer price v2,3, (7)
SC2,3,1 = [tpb = 0, tpe = 10, |r| ≤ 100, 0 ≤ p ≤ 100, φ = 105]
SC2,3,2 = [tpb = 10, tpe = 20, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 700, φ = 140]
SC2,3,3 = [tpb = 30, tpe = 60, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 700, φ = 135]
G3’s supply offer consists of two GenPorts with multiple SCs:
GenPort3,1 ={SC3,1,1,SC3,1,2,SC3,1,3} at offer price v3,1, (8)
SC3,1,1 = [tpb = 10, tpe = 20, |r| ≤ 300, 0 ≤ p ≤ 900, φ = 175]
SC3,1,2 = [tpb = 33, tpe = 39, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 400, φ = 155]
SC3,1,3 = [tpb = 48, tpe = 54, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 400, φ = 155]
GenPort3,2 ={SC3,2,1,SC3,2,2,SC3,2,3} at offer price v3,2, (9)
SC3,2,1 = [tpb = 10, tpe = 20, |r| ≤ 300, 0 ≤ p ≤ 900, φ = 175]
SC3,2,2 = [tpb = 30, tpe = 39, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 400, φ = 150]
SC3,2,3 = [tpb = 44, tpe = 54, |r| ≤ 200, 0 ≤ p ≤ 400, φ = 150]
3.4 Power-Balance Constraints for ISOPorts
Any ISOPort cleared by the ISO in the RTM must permit the achievement of a
Zero Balance Gap (ZBG), i.e., an exact balancing of RTM-cleared generation
against the ISO’s forecasted hour-H net load profile in Fig. 4. For example,
Figs. 5-7 show how each of the following ISOPorts enables the achievement of
a ZBG:
ISOPort1 = {GenPort1,1,GenPort2,2,GenPort3,1} (10)
ISOPort2 = {GenPort1,1,GenPort2,3,GenPort3,1} (11)
ISOPort3 = {GenPort1,2,GenPort2,3,GenPort3,2} (12)
Each color in these figures indicates the dispatch of generation from a particular
GenPort for a particular GenCo, and different shades of the same color indicate
the dispatch of generation from distinct SCs within a particular GenPort.
Consider, in particular, Fig. 6 for ISOPort2 in (11). The yellow areas cor-
respond to GenPort1,1 in (3), and the single shade of yellow represents energy
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Figure 5: Zero balance gap achieved by ISOPort1 for hour H of day D
Figure 6: Zero balance gap achieved by ISOPort2 for hour H of day D
Figure 7: Zero balance gap achieved by ISOPort3 for hour H of day D
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dispatched via this GenPort’s single SC constituent, SC1,1. The green areas cor-
respond to GenPort2,3 in (7), and the two areas with different shades of green
represent the energy dispatched via two of this GenPort’s three SC constituents,
SC2,3,2 and SC2,3,3. Finally, the blue areas correspond to GenPort3,1 in (8), and
the three areas with different shades of blue represent the energy dispatched
via this GenPort’s three SC constituents, SC3,1,1, SC3,1,2, and SC3,1,3.
3.5 Expected Total Cost of a Power-Balanced ISOPort
Consider any ISOPort=(GenPort1,GenPort2,GenPort3) that achieves a ZBG for
hour H. The expected total cost of this ISOPort is the sum of payments aris-
ing from two sources: (i) the portfolio offer prices {v1, v2, v3} that must be paid
to GenCos G1, G2, and G3 for the procurement of GenPort1, GenPort2, and
GenPort3; and (ii) the total performance payments the ISO expects it will have
to make to G1, G2, and G3 for down/up energy delivery during hour H under the
contractual terms of these constituent GenPorts in order to achieve the ZBG.
For example, to calculate the expected total performance payments (ii) im-
plied by the ZBG-implementation of ISOPort2 depicted in Fig. 6, first measure
the energy (MWh) for each of the areas in Fig. 6 with a distinct color shading;
each such area corresponds to a distinct SC implementation. Next, multiply
each of these energy amounts by the performance price φ ($/MWh) included
among the contractual terms of the corresponding SC. Finally, add up all of
these amounts.
3.6 Reserve Inherent in a Power-Balanced ISOPort
The achievement of a ZBG by an ISOPort implies that the generation available
through this ISOPort is capable of balancing the ISO’s forecasted hour-H net
load profile. However, if the SCs constituting this ISOPort include swing, then
the ISOPort can also achieve a ZBG for a range of hour-H net load profiles that
deviate from the ISO’s forecasted hour-H net load profile. Hereafter, this range
will be referred to as the Reserve Range (RR) of the ZBG ISOPort.
The RR of a ZBG ISOPort with swing in its contractual terms is a robust-
control device for net load balancing, eliminating the need for the ISO to con-
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sider detailed net load scenarios and scenario probabilities. However, its exact
form depends in a complicated manner on the particular attribute specifications
of the SCs that constitute the ISOPort as well as on the minute-by-minute op-
erating state of the GenCo suppliers, i.e., the GenCos that have offered these
SCs. Consequently, in any practical application, the RR will have to be approxi-
mated.
For example, Figs. 8 through 10 plot approximate RRs for ISOPorts 1, 2, and
3 in (10) through (12) by assuming that the GenCo suppliers at the start of each
minute M are at their ZBG-generation levels. The depicted approximate RRs
are conditional on the ISO’s forecasted hour-H net load profile shown in Fig. 4
and on the ISO’s hour-H ZBG implementations for ISOPorts 1, 2, and 3 shown
in Figs. 5 through 7.
Figure 8: Reserve range RR for ISOPort1 during hour H of day D
In particular, the approximate RR depicted in Fig. 9 for ISOPort2 was derived
by means of the following steps, applicable for any ZBG ISOPort. At the start
of each minute M of hour H, calculate the minimum and maximum power levels
RRminM and RRmaxM that could be attained at the end of minute M. These minimum
and maximum power levels depend on: (a) the contractual terms of the SCs
constituting ISOPort2; (b) the particular ZBG implementation of ISOPort2 for
hour H; and (c) the ZBG operating state of each GenCo supplier for ISOPort2 at
the start of each minute M of hour H.
Specifically, for each GenCo supplier Gi, and for each minute M during the
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Figure 9: Reserve range RR for ISOPort2 during hour H of day D
Figure 10: Reserve range RR for ISOPort3 during hour H of day D
operating hour H, let Geni,M denote the ZBG generation level (MW) of Gi at the
start of M. Also, let rDi,M / rUi,M denote the down/up ramp-rate limits (MW/min) for
Gi during M, and let pmini,M / pmaxi,M denote the min/max power limits (MW) for Gi at
the end of M. Then the lower and upper bounds on the power levels that could
be delivered by Gi at the end of M, conditional on its ZBG state at the start of
M, are given by
PILi,M = max {Geni,M − rDi,M , pmini,M } ≥ pmini,M (13)
PIUi,M = min {Geni,M + rUi,M , pmaxi,M } ≤ pmaxi,M (14)
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The minimum power level RRminM attainable for the system as a whole at the
end of minute M can be approximated by summing the lower power bounds
(13) across the set GH of GenCo suppliers Gi. Similarly, the maximum power
level RRmaxM attainable for the system as a whole at the end of minute M can be
approximated by summing the upper power bounds (14) across the set GH of
GenCo suppliers Gi. The reserve range RRM at the end of minute M is then
approximately given by the power-level interval between these summed lower
and upper bounds:
RRM = [RRminM , RR
max
M ] = [
∑
i∈GH
PILi,M ,
∑
i∈GH
PIUi,M ] (15)
and the RR over the entire hour H, expressed at the granularity of minutes, is
approximately given by
RR = {RRM |M ∈ H} (16)
To illustrate in more concrete terms the determination of the RR for any given
hour H, consider the following simple example. Let the net load profile for some
operating hour H be as depicted in Fig. 4. Suppose the ISO is planning to
achieve a ZBG for this net load profile by implementation of ISOPort2 in (11) with
GenCo suppliers G1, G2, and G3, where the dispatch levels for these GenCo
suppliers are as depicted in Fig. 6.
Suppose the system is at the start of minute M=35 (or equivalently, at the
end of minute M=34). The ZBG generation levels for G1, G2, and G3 are
400MW, 600MW, and 200MW, respectively. The down/up ramp-rate limits for
G1 are rD1,35 = rU1,35 = 100MW/min, and the min/max power limits for G1 are
pmin1,35 = 0MW and pmax1,35 = 500MW. The down/up ramp-rate limits for G2 are
rD2,35 = r
U
2,35 = 200MW/min and the min/max power limits for G2 are pmin2,35 = 0MW
and pmax2,35 = 700MW. Finally, the down/up ramp-rate limits for G3 are rD3,35 = rU3,35
= 200MW/min and the min/max power limits for G3 are pmin3,35 = 0MW and pmax3,35 =
400MW.
Given these conditions at the start of M=35, the lower and upper power
bounds attainable by each GenCo supplier at the end of minute M=35 can be
calculated using (13) and (14), as follows:
PIL1,35 = max {400MW − 100MW, 0MW} = 300MW
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PIU1,35 = min {400MW + 100MW, 500MW} = 500MW
PIL2,35 = max {600MW − 200MW, 0MW} = 400MW
PIU2,35 = min {600MW + 200MW, 700MW} = 700MW
PIL3,35 = max {200MW − 200MW, 0MW} = 0MW
PIU3,35 = min {200MW + 200MW, 400MW} = 400MW
Consequently, the reserve range RR35 at the end of minute M=35 can be ap-
proximated using (15), as follows:
RR35 = [300MW + 400MW + 0MW, 500MW + 700MW + 400MW ]
= [700MW, 1, 600MW ] (17)
The above method is used to derive the plots in Figs. 8-10 for the complete
hour-H RRs for ISOPorts 1, 2, and 3 described in (10) through (12).
The GenCos can seek compensation for the RR characteristics of their RTM-
offered GenPorts through their GenPort offer prices. In addition, GenCos with
cleared GenPorts will be compensated ex post for any actual down/up energy
they deliver during hour H, using the performance prices φ appearing among
the contractual terms of these cleared GenPorts. This includes, in particular,
compensation for any down/up energy needed to balance deviations between
actual and ISO-forecasted real-time loads.
3.7 Practical Determination of Optimal ISOPorts
Let L = {LM | 1 ≤ M ≤ 60} denote the ISO-forecasted aggregate net load
profile for hour H depicted in Fig. 4, expressed at the granularity of minutes
M. Suppose the ISO’s system-wide requirements for down/up reserve during H
can be expressed in terms of the following restrictions on the lower and upper
bounds of the reserve range RR corresponding to any ZBG ISOPort cleared to
balance L, where α∗ = (αD∗, αU∗) ≥ 0: For each minute M of hour H,
RRminM ≤ [1− αD∗]LM ≤ [1 + αU∗]LM ≤ RRmaxM (18)
Suppose at least one feasible ISOPort achieves a ZBG for H. Then the ISO
can formulate its RTM optimization problem as a multi-criteria optimization prob-
lem with three lexicographically-ordered objectives: (i) ensure a ZBG; (ii) ensure
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system-wide RR reliability at level α∗, i.e., satisfy condition (18) for the aggre-
gate net load profile L; and (iii) minimize the expected total cost of ensuring (i)
and (ii).
More precisely, as schematically depicted in Fig. 11(a), the ISO can under-
take the following three steps in sequence. First, determine the set IZ of all
feasible ISOPorts that achieve a ZBG. Second, determine the (possibly empty)
subset IZα∗ of IZ for which the RR requirement (18) is satisfied. Third, deter-
mine the subset IZ,MT Cα∗ of IZα∗ entailing minimum expected total cost, where
this expected total cost consists of both GenPort procurement costs and ex-
pected ex-post GenPort performance costs for ensuring a ZBG that satisfies
RR requirement (18). Any element of IZ,MT Cα∗ constitutes an optimal ISOPort
selection for the RTM.
Figure 11: Depiction of the subsets IZ,MT Cα∗ and ILZ,MT CLα∗ of optimal (minimum
total expected cost) ISOPorts subject to (a) system-wide ZBG and RR con-
straints in the absence of binding transmission constraints and (b) local ZBG
and RR constraints in the presence of binding transmission constraints.
Relatively small values for (αD∗,αU∗) in (18) might be needed to ensure
the non-emptiness of IZα∗. For example, as depicted in Figs. 8-10, ISOPort1,
ISOPort2, and ISOPort3 can each achieve a ZBG that satisfies the RRα∗ con-
straint (18) when αD∗ = αU∗ = 0. However, only ISOPort3 can achieve a ZBG
that satisfies the RRα∗ constraint (18) when αD∗ = αU∗ = 0.05. Smaller values
for αD∗ and αU∗ should also entail lower minimum total costs due to less need
24
for swing in the cleared SCs. On the other hand, setting these values too small
could jeopardize grid reliability if actual real-time net loads differ significantly
from their forecasted levels.
3.8 Incorporation of Transmission-Line Limits
Until now, our RTM illustrative example has assumed an absence of transmis-
sion congestion. This simplification has permitted us to focus solely on the eco-
nomic dispatch problem of ensuring a balance between aggregate dispatched
generation and ISO-forecasted aggregate net load, subject to a system-wide
RRα∗ constraint (18).
Consider, instead, an RTM for which the flow of power on each transmission
line is subject to a potentially binding limit. In this case it is not sufficient to
consider power and ramp-rate availability on a system-wide basis alone, since
transmission congestion could limit the ability to move power from one bus to
another. Rather, to ensure reliability, an ISO will need to impose a ZBG con-
straint at each bus, hereafter referred to as a local ZBG constraint.5 Moreover,
the ISO will also presumably wish to impose an RRα∗ constraint (18) at each
bus, hereafter referred to as a local RRα∗ constraint.6
Note that a ZBG ISOPort satisfying a local RRα∗ constraint at each bus auto-
matically satisfies a system-wide RRα∗ constraint. Consequently, as depicted in
Fig. 11(b), the following nested relationships hold. The set ILZα∗ consisting of all
feasible ISOPorts satisfying a local ZBG constraint at each bus and a system-
wide RRα∗ constraint is a subset of IZα∗. Moreover, the set ILZLα∗ consisting of all
feasible ISOPort selections satisfying local ZBG and RRα∗ constraints at each
5Ignoring losses, the local ZBG constraint at each bus k is an equation ensuring that the total
power injected at bus k equals the total power withdrawn at bus k plus the total power flowing
out from bus k to other buses.
6In practice, local reserve requirements are imposed at the level of reserve zones. Roughly
defined, a reserve zone is a grid region (buses plus connecting transmission lines) with nor-
mally negligible internal congestion that can on occasion operate as a load pocket because the
transmission lines linking this region to other grid regions become congested. Load pockets
can cause reliability problems if the generation capacity internal to the pocket is not sufficient to
meet internal load. In this subsection, reserve zones are assumed to consist of singleton buses
for ease of exposition.
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bus is a subset of ILZα∗ . Finally, the set ILZ,MT CLα∗ consisting of all optimal (min-
imum expected total cost) ISOPort selections for the RTM SCED optimization
augmented with local ZBG and RRα∗ constraints at each bus is a subset of ILZLα∗.
For example, as in Section 3.2, consider an RTM with three GenCo partic-
ipants G1, G2, and G3 that takes place immediately before an operating hour
H on some day D. Assume, now, that this RTM is operating over a 2-bus trans-
mission grid with buses A and B, where G1 is located at bus A and G2 and G3
are located at bus B, and that the transmission line connecting buses A and B
has a capacity limit of 1,100MW. As depicted in Fig. 4, the ISO-forecasted net
load at the end of minute M=15 for hour H is L15=2,000MW. Assume the ISO
has forecasted that L15 will be divided into a net load LA=1,500MW at bus A,
and a net load LB=500MW at bus B.
Suppose the ISO clears the ISOPort3 (12) in the RTM in an attempt to ensure
a ZBG for hour H. The GenCo suppliers for ISOPort3 are G1, G2, and G3. Sup-
pose the generation levels for G1, G2, and G3 at the start of minute M=15 are
given by 400MW, 600MW and 600MW, respectively. Using the contractual terms
of the SCs in ISOPort3, it can then be shown that the feasible power intervals for
G1, G2, and G3 at the end of minute M=15 are as follows:7 [280MW,500MW]
for G1; [400MW,700MW] for G2; and [300MW,900MW] for G3.
Consequently, the selection of ISOPort3 permits the ISO to achieve a local
ZBG at the end of minute M=15 with power flowing from bus B to bus A. Specif-
ically, as depicted in Fig. 12, G1 at bus A can be dispatched at 500MW, which
is its maximum possible power level. Also, G2 at bus B can be dispatched at
600MW, which is below its maximum possible power level of 700MW, and G3 at
bus B can be dispatched at its maximum possible power level of 900MW. The
net load LA=1,500MW at bus A exceeds by 1,000MW the 500MW of power gen-
erated by G1. However, the 1,500MW of power generated at bus B by G2 and
7Given ISOPort3, the down/up ramp-rate limits for G1, G2, and G3 during M=15 are rD1,15 =
rU1,15 = 120MW/min, rD2,15 = rU2,15 = 200MW/min, and rD3,15 = rU3,15 = 300MW/min. Also, the
min/max power limits for G1, G2, and G3 at the end of M=15 are pmin1,15 = 0MW, pmax1,15 = 500MW,
pmin2,15 = 0MW, pmax2,15 = 700MW, pmin3,15 = 0MW, and pmax3,15 = 900MW. These conditions, together with
the assumed generation levels for G1, G2, and G3 at the start of minute M=15, determine the
feasible power intervals for G1, G2, and G3 at the end of M=15. For example, for G1 this feasible
power interval is given by [FPImin1 , FPImax1 ] where FPImin1 = max {400MW − 120MW, 0MW} =
280MW and FPImax1 = min {400MW + 120MW, 500MW} = 500MW.
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Figure 12: Depiction of an RTM ISOPort selection that satisfies local ZBG and
RRα∗ constraints at each bus A and B at the end of minute M=15 for hour H of
day D, where αD∗ = αU∗ = 0.05.
G3 exceeds the net load LB=500MW at bus B by 1,000MW; and this 1,000MW
can be transferred from bus B to bus A to satisfy the remaining net load at bus
A without violating the 1,100MW transmission line limit.
Now consider the additional RTM goal of ensuring a local RRα∗ constraint at
each bus A and B at the end of minute M=15, with α∗ = (0.05, 0.05). To satisfy
the 5% up-power requirements of these local RRα∗ constraints, the ISO needs
+75MW of up-power reserve at bus A (5% of LA=1,500MW) and +25MW of up-
power reserve at bus B (5% of LB=500MW). As seen in Fig. 12, the +75MW
requirement at bus A is satisfied under ISOPort3 because G2 at bus B has
+75MW of unencumbered up-power that can flow to bus A without violation
of the transmission line limit. Moreover, the +25MW requirement at bus B is
satisfied under ISOPort3 because G2 at bus B has +25MW of additional unen-
cumbered up-power.
Conversely, to satisfy the 5% down-power requirements of these local RRα∗
constraints, the ISO needs -75MW of down-power reserve at bus A and -25MW
of down-power reserve at bus B. As seen in Fig. 12, the -75MW requirement
at bus A is satisfied because G1 can feasibly reduce its 500MW dispatch level
to 425MW. Moreover, the -25MW requirement at bus B is satisfied because G2
and G3 can feasibly reduce their total dispatch level by 25MW, either separately
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or in combination.
4 Linkages between the RTM and the DAM
4.1 Overview
This section extends the RTM illustrative example presented in Section 3 to
include the prior operations of a DAM, as depicted in Fig. 13.
Figure 13: Illustrative time-line for DAM/RTM linkages
This DAM is assumed to operate in accordance with the general DAM de-
scription provided in Section 2.3. However, we maintain the simplifying assump-
tions introduced in Section 3 that load is not price responsive and that all line
losses are negligible; and we also assume the absence of transmission conges-
tion to further ease graphical depictions.
A key distinction between the DAM on day D-1 and the RTM on day D is
that power-balance constraints in the DAM are based on LSE demand bids, not
on the ISO’s own forecasts for LSE-customer loads. LSE demand bids for hour
H are assumed to take the form of constant non-price-responsive power levels,
a simple block-energy form that greatly eases graphical exposition.8 VER as-
available generation during hour H is treated as negative load.
Nevertheless, the ISO managing the DAM has a fiduciary responsibility to
balance actual real-time net loads to ensure grid reliability. Consequently, the
8Two-part LSE demand bids including both price-responsive and non-price-responsive por-
tions, as in actual U.S. ISO-managed wholesale power markets, can be modeled by allowing
each LSE to actively bid for multiple block-energy contracts at differing bid prices in addition to
submitting a non-price-responsive block energy contract.
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ISO is permitted to bid for SCs in the DAM on day D-1 to ensure reserve require-
ments are met, where these reserve requirements are informed by the ISO’s
own next-day net load forecasts.9 The ISO then matches and clears DAM-
submitted SC bids and offers to achieve a least-cost ZBG subject to system
constraints and reserve requirements. The ISO subsequently enters into the
RTM on day D with a record of all DAM-cleared SCs and conducts RTM opera-
tions conditional on this SC inventory.
The operations of the RTM for a particular operating hour H in the absence
of SC inventory conditioning were illustrated in Section 3. This illustration will
now be extended to show how RTM operations for hour H could be affected
by SC inventory conditioning. Section 4.2 considers the case in which reserve
requirements are entirely for regulation (load-balancing) purposes. Contingency
reserve requirements are considered in Section 4.3.
4.2 DAM Linkages with Regulation Reserve Requirements
Let LH denote the actual net load profile for hour H of day D, and let L
F,DAM
H
denote the ISO’s forecast for LH at the start of the DAM. Figure 14 illustrates how
the DAM-cleared LSE demand bids (all in block-energy form) imply a constant
power level for hour H that can deviate from LF,DAMH . The difference between
the two represents the down/up regulation reserve that the ISO would need to
procure in the DAM in order to expect to be able to achieve actual net load
balancing for hour H, conditional on its own net load forecasts. Hereafter this
difference will be denoted by LNF,DAMH .
In addition to net load balancing, however, the ISO needs to ensure that
it satisfies DAM down/up regulation reserve requirements. Suppose these re-
quirements take the form of a system-wide RR constraint (18) with α∗DAM =
(0.10, 0.10). This means that the ISO must procure SCs in the DAM with suffi-
cient swing (flexibility) in their contractual terms that they are capable of cover-
ing a corridor of potential net load profiles around the ISO’s forecasted real-time
net load profile LNF,DAMH with a 10% width determined by α
∗
DAM . This corridor,
hereafter referred to as the DAM 10% power corridor, is depicted in Fig. 15.
9As in Section 2.3, we require all costs arising from the ISO’s DAM SC procurement to be
charged to market participants in order to preserve the ISO’s non-profit status.
29
Figure 14: DAM-cleared LSE demand bids for hour H vs. the ISO’s forecasted
net load profile LF,DAMH for hour H at the time of the DAM
Figure 15: The DAM 10% power corridor for hour H of day D, conditional on the
ISO’s DAM-forecasted net load profile LNF,DAMH for hour H of day D
As depicted in Fig. 16, the forecast LF,DAMH that the ISO forms for LH at
the time of the DAM will typically differ from the forecast LF,RTMH that the ISO
forms for LH at the time of the RTM.10 For example, net load could be affected
by uncertain weather conditions, and the ISO could have improved information
about these weather conditions at the time of the RTM relative to the information
10Note LF,RTMH in Fig. 16 coincides with the ISO-forecasted net load profile in Fig. 4.
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available to the ISO at the time of the DAM.
Figure 16: RTM vs. DAM ISO-forecasted net load profiles LF,RTMH and L
F,DAM
H
for hour H of day D
The ISO’s RTM objective is to ensure a least-cost ZBG for hour H of day
D subject to regulation reserve requirements, conditional on its updated net
load forecast LF,RTMH , GenCo/DRR/ESD RTM supply offers, and existing DAM-
cleared SCs. Suppose the reserve requirements take the form of a system-wide
RR constraint (18) with α∗RTM = (0.05, 0.05).11 This means that the ISO must
ensure, by the end of the RTM, that SCs have been procured with sufficient
swing (flexibility) in their contractual terms that they are capable of covering a
corridor of potential net load profiles around the ISO’s forecasted real-time net
load profile LF,RTMH with a 5% width determined by α
∗
RTM . Call this corridor the
RTM 5% power corridor.
The gap GLM = [PC
L,RTM
M −PCL,DAM ] between the lower bound PCL,RTMM of the
RTM 5% power corridor and the lower bound PCL,DAM of the DAM 10% power
corridor for minute M of hour H determines the down-power amount PdownM the
ISO needs to procure in the RTM for injection during minute M of hour H. Specif-
ically,
PdownM = min{GLM , 0} (19)
Similarly, the gap GUM = [PC
U,RTM
M −PCU,DAM ] between the upper bound PCU,RTMM
11The ISO’s net load forecast errors in the RTM can be expected to be smaller than the
ISO’s net load forecast errors in the DAM, and this is reflected in the specification of smaller
component values for α∗RTM in comparison with α
∗
DAM .
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of the RTM 5% power corridor and the upper-bound PCU,DAM of the DAM 10%
power corridor for minute M of hour H determines the up-power amount PupM that
the ISO needs to procure in the RTM for injection during minute M of hour H.
Specifically,
PupM = max{GUM , 0} (20)
Figure 17 illustrates the RTM down/up power requirements PdownM and P
up
M
that are implied by the lower and upper bounds PCL,RTMM , PC
L,DA
M , PC
U,RTM
M ,
and PCU,DAM for each minute M of hour H. Note, for example, that no down-
power procurement is needed in the RTM during minutes 10 to 20 of hour H
because PCL,DAM < PC
L,RTM
M ≤ 0 over this time interval. On the other hand,
up-power procurement is needed in the RTM during minutes 10 to 20 of hour H
because PCU,RTMM > PC
U,DA
M ≥ 0 during this time interval.
Figure 17: RTM down/up power procurement needed to satisfy net load balanc-
ing with a 5% RR constraint for hour H of day D, conditional on LF,RTMH and the
DAM 10% power corridor
In summary, permitting linkages between the DAM and the RTM changes the
form of the ISOPorts available for ISO selection in the RTM. For the illustrative
example developed in Section 3, each ISOPort in the collection IZα∗ of ISOPorts
achieving an RTM ZBG subject to the RTM RR constraint (18) for some given
α∗RTM now takes the form
ISOPort = {GenPort1,GenPort2,GenPort3 | Contract Inventory} (21)
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The contract inventory appearing in (21) consists of all SCs procured in the
DAM whose exercise and/or use in combination with GenPort1, GenPort2, and
GenPort3 permits the achievement of an RTM ZBG subject to the RTM RR
constraint. For comparative selection purposes, the relevant (i.e., avoidable)
expected total cost of ISOPort (21) thus consists of two parts:
(i) the performance payments arising from the exercise and/or use of the
SCs in the contract inventory to achieve an RTM ZBG subject to the RTM
RR constraint;12
(ii) the portfolio offer prices and performance payments arising from the
RTM-procurement and implementation of the SCs comprising GenPort1,
GenPort2, and GenPort3.
The RTM is a balancing mechanism permitting the contract inventory to be
supplemented as needed with new SC procurement to achieve real-time net
load balancing. As demonstrated in Fig. 17, the size of the RTM trade volume
can be very small; it will tend to vary inversely with the amount of swing in the
contract inventory.
Finally, under our proposed SC system, compensation obligations are sep-
arately incurred in the DAM (for service availability), in the RTM (for service
availability), and in real time (for service performance). However, as illustrated
in Fig. 18, the compensation obligations incurred for any particular operating
hour H can in fact be settled at a single time point subsequent to H.
4.3 Contingency Reserve Considerations
Contingency reserve is spinning (synchronized) or non-spinning generation ca-
pacity that is able to reach a declared output level within a stated time interval
in order to handle unusual power needs, such as the forced outage of a line or
unit (Ellison et al., 2012). For resources with relatively slow ramp rates, the pro-
vision of contingency reserve through the RTM could be difficult if not impossi-
12Note that the SCs in the contract inventory have already been procured, hence their pro-
curement costs are sunk (i.e., unavoidable) costs that should not affect the ISO’s RTM selection
of an ISOPort.
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Figure 18: A possible time-line for hour-H settlements
ble. In addition, regulation reserve can be efficiently substituted for contingency
reserve under some market and system conditions.
Consequently, we propose that the ISO be permitted to clear an appropriate
combination of SCs in the DAM to satisfy reserve requirements for both normal
and contingency operating conditions, in addition to meeting net load balancing
needs. As for regulation reserve, we require all of the ISO’s DAM procurement
costs for contingency reserve to be charged to market participants in order to
preserve the ISO’s non-profit status.
For resources with must-run constraints (pmin > 0) as well as UC costs (e.g.,
no-load and start-up/shut-down costs), we anticipate that the ISO’s contingency
reserve procurement would largely occur through the procurement of SCs in
option form. These types of contracts provide a “no exercise” option that could
be used to save UC costs in cases in which updated ISO forecasts of system
conditions render some contingency reserve unnecessary as an operating point
approaches.
For resources with no must-run constraints (pmin = 0), there is no operational
difference for the ISO in securing contingency reserve either through an SC in
firm form or through an SC in option form as long as these SCs have identical
contractual terms apart from exercise option(s). This follows because the ISO
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can choose to implement the SC in firm form at a power level p = 0, thus
effectively achieving the “no exercise” option of the SC in option form. However,
the non-profit ISO has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure efficient operation of
the power grid. Early signaling of “no exercise” decisions to the issuers of SCs
in option form might permit these issuers to direct their resources to alternative
uses, thus avoiding lost opportunity costs.
5 Discussion
5.1 Comparison with Real-World TSO/ISO Operations
As indicated in Table 1, our ISO-managed DAM/RTM design for the support of
SC trading is structurally similar to existing European and U.S. wholesale power
market designs. European wholesale power markets include “spot” (day-ahead)
and intraday markets for energy and reserve managed by TSOs operating on a
non-profit-making basis (ENTSO-E, 2015; EPEX, 2015). U.S. wholesale power
markets include day-ahead and real-time markets for energy and reserve man-
aged by non-profit ISOs (EIA, 2015).
Moreover, the idea of permitting resources to offer options into TSO/ISO-
managed wholesale power markets is not new. For example, Moriarty and Pal-
czewski (2014) demonstrate how a small electricity storage unit could advan-
tageously be permitted to offer American call options into a centrally-managed
real-time imbalance market to facilitate net load balancing.
On the other hand, our SC system differs sharply from current TSO/ISO
operations in other regards. SCs with swing function as intrinsically combined
energy and reserve products permitting the provision of a wide range of flexibly-
provided services. Also, rewards and penalties can be included in SC perfor-
mance payment methods to encourage good service performance, e.g., accu-
rate load forecasting and/or accurate following of dispatch instructions, where
the rewards and penalties are assessed ex post based on actual performance.
This inclusion could be required at the SC system level. Alternatively, SC sup-
pliers could voluntarily undertake this inclusion as a way to signal the quality of
their offered services to potential SC buyers.
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Moreover, our SC system functions as a two-part pricing system under which
all payments are compensations for value rendered, with no additional market
or out-of-market payment adjustments required. Service availability compensa-
tion (in the form of SC offer-price payments) becomes obligatory at the com-
mencement of service availability, i.e., as soon as SC supply offers are cleared.
In contrast, service performance compensation (through SC performance pay-
ment methods) does not become obligatory until services have been performed
in real time.
This two-part pricing system contrasts sharply with the Locational Marginal
Pricing (LMP) systems currently implemented in U.S. ISO-managed wholesale
power markets. Schweppe et al. (1988) conceptualized LMPs for true spot
markets in which there is no separation in time between payment and deliv-
ery, not for forward markets such as DAMs and RTMs. Currently, DAM LMP
payment commitments are made in advance for the anticipated real-time dis-
patch of DAM-cleared generation, that is, in advance of value received. They
are then subsequently adjusted through RTM LMP payments to account for any
deviations between DAM and RTM scheduled dispatch levels.
Moreover, DAM/RTM LMP payments do not necessarily provide adequate
compensation for the costs incurred by resources to provide service availability.
The perceived need to cover such costs more fully has led to the institution of
capacity markets and various out-of-market uplift payments.
5.2 Comparison with Existing Standardized Power Contracts
The restructuring of European and U.S. electricity sectors, together with their
increased reliance on VER generation, has resulted in increased price and vol-
ume risks for utilities and independent power producers as prices and net loads
have become more volatile and difficult to forecast (Lemming, 2004). Financial
and physical instruments are now heavily traded in Europe and the U.S. on ex-
changes and in over-the-counter markets as a means for hedging exposure to
these risks (A¨id, 2015; Deng and Oren, 2006; EEX, 2015; NYMEX, 2015).
In Europe, standardized power contracts have been developed by the Agency
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER, 2014). In the U.S., standard-
ized power contracts have been developed by the Edison Electric Institute and
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the Western Systems Power Pool (EEI, 2014; WSPP, 2014). These widely used
contracts are negotiated bilateral contracts between two counterparties.
Our proposed standardized contracts (SCs) differ in three important ways
from ACER, EEI, and WSPP contracts. First, SCs are bids/offers for submission
to an ISO-managed wholesale power market for possible clearing against other
submitted offers/bids. In contrast, an ACER, EEI, or WSPP contract is a private
agreement between two counterparties; it is subsequently self-scheduled in a
TSO/ISO-managed wholesale power market only if fulfillment of the terms of the
contract requires the use of power transmission lines.
Second, although the services provided through the contractual terms of
SCs can cover the full range of product attributes included in ACER, EEI, and
WSPP contracts, SC services are not rigidly separated into product types (ca-
pacity, reserve, and energy). Rather, SC services can be used to fulfill capacity
requirements (general availability), reserve requirements (designated availabil-
ity), and/or energy requirements (scheduled real-time dispatch) as appropriate.
Third, SCs permit swing (flexibility) in all of the services included in their
contractual terms. In contrast, swing in ACER, EEI, and WSPP contracts is
limited to option exercise dates in contracts taking an option form (ACER, 2014;
EEI, 2014; WSPP, 2014).
5.3 Discriminatory vs. Uniform Pricing of Contracts
A market is said to exhibit market efficiency if the total net surplus extracted
from the market by the market participants is at a maximum. Total net surplus
is measured in practice as the sum of the differences between the buyers’ max-
imum willingness to pay and the sellers’ minimum acceptable payment for each
successively traded commodity unit; see Stoft (2002) and Tesfatsion (2009).
In order for market efficiency to hold, all valued attributes of a market-traded
commodity must be properly priced and compensated at the margin. In a day-
ahead energy market organized as a bid/offer (double) auction, market effi-
ciency can be achieved by means of a locally uniform pricing mechanism that
assigns the same price to all energy units (MWh) being traded at a particular lo-
cation for delivery at this location at a particular later time; see Tesfatsion (2009)
and Li and Tesfatsion (2011). This is because the units of the traded product,
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characterized by physical type (energy), delivery location, and delivery time, are
homogeneous.
However, a uniform pricing mechanism applied to a traded product does not
necessarily result in market efficiency if the units of this product are not homoge-
neous. In particular, in a market for which buyers and sellers are submitting bids
and offers for differentiated products – referred to as a monopolistically compet-
itive market within economics – the buyers and sellers must be permitted to bid
and offer differentiated prices for units of these differentiated products in order
for these prices to reflect the true value of these units to buyers and sellers at
the margin, a necessary prerequisite for market efficiency.
As discussed in previous sections, the SCs traded in our proposed DAM
and RTM can be highly differentiated products. First, SCs can differ in terms of
the types of services they offer. Second, even if two SCs offer the same types
of services, the two SCs can differ in terms of the amount of swing included
in the specification of these services. Consequently, our DAM and RTM are
monopolistically competitive markets. The most appropriate pricing mechanism
for SCs in our DAM and RTM is thus a discriminatory pricing mechanism in
which SC sellers are permitted to offer differentiated prices for the sale of their
differentiated products and SC buyers are permitted to bid differentiated prices
for the purchase of these differentiated products.
5.4 Comparison with Existing VER Initiatives
A major development in European and U.S. TSO/ISO-managed wholesale power
markets is that increased VER penetration is increasing the volatility of net load
(i.e., load minus as-available generation). Some TSOs/ISOs are revising their
market rules and product definitions to accommodate this development.
For example, as discussed by Navid and Rosenwald (2013) and Xu and
Tretheway (2014), MISO and CAISO have each proposed the introduction of
“flexible ramping” products. Also, as discussed by Seliga et al. (2013), ISO-NE
has introduced a major rule change called “Energy Market Offer Flexibility.” In
addition, some ISOs are exploring innovative ways to incorporate VERs more
fully into DAM/RTM operations. For example, MISO has introduced a new re-
source category called Dispatchable Intermittent Resource (DIR), designed pri-
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marily for its wind resources (MISO, 2011).
Our proposed SC system is not in conflict with the above market develop-
ments. To the contrary, as detailed in previous sections, SC trading would pro-
vide additional types of flexibility to both market participants and system opera-
tors that complement and extend these developments.
5.5 Robust-Control Management of Uncertain Net Load
A key requirement of standard two-stage stochastic SCUC formulations is the
need to specify probability-weighted load scenarios with sufficient accuracy that
a switch from currently-used deterministic SCUC formulations can be justified
in terms of improved performance. For example, as shown in Krishnamurthy et
al. (2015), given a simulated “true” load distribution and an approximate set S
of load scenarios, a deterministic SCUC formulation can result in lower energy
costs than a stochastic SCUC formulation based on S if reserve requirements
for the former are set within a “sweet spot” range of values.
The rapidly growing reliance on VERs, resulting in increased net load un-
certainty and volatility, has encouraged efforts to develop improved stochastic
SCUC formulations based on net load scenarios. See, for example, Morales et
al. (2009), Papavasiliou et al. (2011), and Vrakopoulou et al. (2013). However,
these approaches rely on having an accurate modeling of the stochastic behav-
ior of net load, a goal that has not yet been attained for as-available generation
such as wind and solar power. In addition, to ensure tractability, they require the
application of scenario reduction techniques capable of retaining the essential
features of the net load scenarios derived from the original stochastic net load
modeling.
Our proposed SC system offers an alternative robust-control approach to
the management of uncertain net load. As detailed in Section 3, under this
system the ISO considers in advance of an operating period how much swing
(flexibility) will be needed in cleared SCs to cover a suitably wide corridor around
an expected net load profile for this operating period. Consequently, a detailed
specification of net load scenarios is not required.
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5.6 Amelioration of Merit-Order and Missing-Money Issues
As noted in Section 5.4, centrally-managed wholesale power markets such as
MISO are attempting to integrate VERs into the operations of their DAMs by
permitting these resources to submit DAM supply offers based on generation
forecasts. VERs tend to have relatively low marginal dispatch costs. Hence,
increased VER participation tends to decrease the profits of thermal generators
by reducing day-ahead energy prices, an outcome referred to in the power sys-
tems literature as the merit-order effect (Sensfuß et al., 2008). On the other
hand, increased VER penetration requires an increase in flexibly-controllable
generation to handle the resulting increased volatility of net load. Given the
current state of electric energy storage development, this increase in flexibly-
controllable generation must largely come from thermal generation.
The problem is then as follows. How can an adequate amount of flexibly-
controllable thermal generation be ensured for matching the increased volatility
of net load resulting from an increased penetration of VERs when the latter
penetration reduces thermal generation profits and hence the incentive to invest
in and maintain thermal generation?
This problem can be ameliorated by guaranteeing that thermal generators
receive full compensation for all of the valuable services they provide, including
flexibly-controllable generation. Our SC system permits this full compensation.
Specifically, under our SC system a thermal generator can offer a GenPort
(i.e., a portfolio of SCs) that accurately expresses the types of services it can
provide as well as the degree of flexibility (swing) with which each of these types
of services can be provided. The generator should offer this GenPort at a price
that fully covers the costs it would incur to ensure the availability of these ser-
vices, including capital and lost opportunity costs. If the GenPort is cleared, the
generator receives an immediate compensation commitment for service avail-
ability equal to the GenPort’s offer price. The generator also receives ex-post
compensation for any real-time services performed under the terms of the Gen-
Port, where this ex-post compensation is determined by the performance pay-
ment methods appearing in the SCs that comprise the GenPort.
Another problem arising in centrally-managed wholesale power markets is
missing money. Cramton and Ockenfels (2012) characterize this problem as
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follows: “In ‘normal’ periods, when there is no shortage of capacity, prices are
below the level needed to cover operating and capital costs of new capacity, and
in scarcity events, prices are unlikely to accurately reflect the scarcity.”
For concreteness, our current paper focuses on the support of SC trading
through relatively short-horizon DAM and RTM operations. More generally, how-
ever, SC trading could be supported by a sequence of linked forward markets
that includes longer-term forward markets with planning horizons spanning a
year or more. In these longer-term forward markets, the two-part pricing of SCs
would permit investors to receive availability and performance payments that
fully cover their capital, lost opportunity, and operating costs, thus helping to
resolve the missing-money problem.
6 Conclusion: Energy Policy Implications
Key policy implications of our proposed market-supported trading of standard-
ized contracts (SCs) permitting swing (flexibility) in their contractual terms are
noted throughout Sections 1 through 5. These policy implications are concisely
summarized below:
(i) The SC system permits separate full market-based compensation for service
availability and service performance
SCs can function both as standardized instruments for the procurement of
service availability in forward markets and as standardized blueprints for the
procurement of service performance in real-time system operations. Thus, SC
trading supports the goals of FERC Order 755 (FERC, 2011); but this support
is for a much broader array of services than envisioned in this order.
ii) The SC system facilitates a level playing field for market participation
The SC system focuses on service provision capability rather than on the
physical characteristics of resources. This should permit and encourage the
participation of a wider array of resources in wholesale power markets.
(iii) The SC system facilitates co-optimization of energy and reserve markets
SCs with swing intrinsically function as both energy and reserve products,
eliminating the need to provide separate eligibility requirements and settlement
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processes for energy versus reserve services.
(vi) The SC system supports forward-market trading of energy and reserve
The offer price of an SC, determined through market processes, compen-
sates the SC issuer for a guarantee of service availability. In contrast, the per-
formance payment method of an SC, appearing among its contractual terms,
determines how the SC issuer is to be compensated ex post for actual services
rendered in real-time operations.
(iv) The SC system provides a fair way for all potential service providers to offer
flexible service availability
SCs with swing permit the providers of these contracts to be compensated
for flexibility in offered services, such as offered exercise times, begin-times,
end-times, down/up ramp rates, and down/up power levels. Moreover, the abil-
ity of one or more resources to offer services in the combined form of an SC
portfolio (GenPort) can enhance the ability of resources to obtain appropriate
compensation for the full value of their services.
(v) The SC system provides system operators with real-time flexibility in service
usage
SCs with swing permit system operators who procure these SCs to imple-
ment the services offered in these SCs in a flexible manner during real-time
operations.
(vii) The SC system encourages accurate load forecasting and the accurate
following of real-time dispatch instructions
Rewards and/or penalties can be incorporated into the performance pay-
ment methods φ appearing among the contractual terms of SC demand bids to
encourage LSEs and other wholesale intermediaries who bid for services on be-
half of retail customers to submit bids that accurately reflect the service needs of
these customers. Similarly, rewards and/or penalties can be incorporated into
the performance payment methods φ appearing among the contractual terms
of SC supply offers to encourage service suppliers to follow real-time service
performance instructions with high accuracy.
(viii) The SC system permits resources to internally manage unit commitment
and generation-capacity constraints
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By offering an SC for a particular operating period, a resource is guarantee-
ing that it can feasibly perform the services represented in this SC during this
period. For generators, this feasibility includes the assurance that power gener-
ation units with suitable capacities will be synchronized to the grid as necessary
to perform these services.
(ix) The SC system permits robust-control management of uncertain net load
Under the SC system, the ISO considers in advance of an operating period
how much swing (flexibility) will be needed in cleared SCs to cover a suitably
wide corridor around an expected net load profile for this operating period. The
SC system thus provides a robust-control alternative to standard stochastic for-
mulations for SCUC/SCED requiring detailed specifications of net load scenar-
ios and scenario probabilities.
(x) The SC system eliminates the need for out-of-market payment adjustments
SC offer prices for service availability and SC performance payments for
service performance provide full compensation for all rendered value, without
need for additional market or out-of-market (OOM) payment adjustments.
(xi) The SC system reduces the complexity of market rules
Properties (i)-(x) reduce the complexity of power market rules, hence the
opportunity for market participants to game these rules for their own advantage.
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Appendix
Table 1: Comparison between proposed SC system and real-world ISOs
ISO name Product Contract Price Settlement Changes under Remarks on
name form determination proposed proposed
process SC system SC system
CAISO Capacity Bilateral contracts Bilateral contracts Negotiated by
counterparties 1. No rigid 1. SC system
Regulation DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Capacity & separation of does not
contracts process for reg., performance capacity, reserve limit bilateral
other anc. payments and energy trade between
services, & energy (Order 755 products market
compliance) participants
Other ancillary DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing 2. SCs with swing
services contracts process for reg., can be used for 2. SC system
other anc. capacity, reserve uses discriminatory
services, & energy (various types), pricing for
Energy DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt LMP pricing and energy SC procurement
contracts process for reg., while current
other anc. 3. Cleared SCs centrally-
services, & energy are separately managed
ERCOT Capacity No capacity DAM/RTM LMP pricing compensated for markets use
market scarcity pricing service availability local uniform
Regulation DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing and for service pricing for
contracts process for reg., performance under product
other anc. a discriminatory- procurement
services, & energy price mechanism
Other ancillary DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing 3. SC system’s
services contracts process for reg., 4. Service two-part pricing
other anc. availability is attained by
services, & energy compensated at discriminatory price
Energy DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt LMP pricing time of SC mechanism
contracts process for reg., procurement eliminates
other anc. through SC offer need for
services, & energy prices and out-of-market
ISO-NE Capacity Forward capacity Capacity Several-steps-ahead SC service make-whole
market contracts auction process to determine performance is payments
capacity settlements compensated
Regulation RTM RTM co-opt Capacity & performance ex post via
contracts process for reg., payments (Order 755 SC performance
other anc. compliance) payment methods
services, & energy
Other ancillary Forward Forward Marginal pricing
services reserve market reserve market;
& RTM RTM co-opt
contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
Energy DAM/RTM Energy opt LMP pricing
contracts in DAM with
reserve
constraint;
Energy co-opt
with reg. &
other anc.
services in
RTM
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ISO name Product Contract Price Settlement Changes under Remarks on
name form determination proposed proposed
process SC system SC system
MISO Capacity Forward capacity Capacity Several-steps-ahead
market contracts auction process to determine
capacity settlements
Regulation DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Capacity & performance
contracts process for reg., payments (Order 755
other anc. compliance)
services, & energy
Other ancillary DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing
services contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
Energy DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt LMP pricing
contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
NYISO Capacity Forward capacity Capacity Several steps ahead
market contracts auction process to determine
capacity settlements
Regulation DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Capacity & performance
contracts process for reg., payments (Order 755
other anc. compliance)
services, & energy
Other ancillary DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing
services contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
Energy DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt LMP pricing
contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
PJM Capacity Forward capacity Capacity Several-steps-ahead
market contracts auction process to determine
capacity settlements
Regulation DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Capacity & performance
contracts process for reg., payments (Order 755
other anc. compliance)
services, & energy
Other ancillary DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing
services contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
Energy DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt LMP pricing
contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
SPP Capacity Bilateral contracts Load shares Invoiced
scheduled in DAM adjusted by by SPP
self-provision
Regulation DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Capacity & performance
contracts process for reg., payments (Order 755
other anc. compliance)
services, & energy
Other ancillary DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt Marginal pricing
services contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
Energy DAM/RTM DAM/RTM co-opt LMP pricing
contracts process for reg.,
other anc.
services, & energy
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